Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game.

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Published in Nature on September 25, 2003

Authors

Dirk Semmann1, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck, Manfred Milinski

Author Affiliations

1: Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute of Limnology, 24306 Plön, Germany.

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